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STAFF CONTROL AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF'S CHALLENGE IN AN
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
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Staff Control And The Chief Of Staff's Challenge In An
Operational Level Headquarters

By

Major Richard F. Vaughn
Infantry

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

5 May 1988

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Operational Level Headquarters**

By

**Major Richard F. Vaughn
Infantry**

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ABSTRACT

STAFF CONTROL AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF'S CHALLENGE IN AN OPERATIONAL LEVEL HEADQUARTERS by MAJ Richard F. Vaughn, USA, 71 pages.

This monograph examines the exercise of staff control by the chiefs of staff at those headquarters either fighting or supporting warfare at the operational level. It is important for those commanders tasked to plan for warfare at the operational level to have firm control of their staffs without becoming personally involved in details. To serve them in this role, they need strong chiefs of staff, who are qualified in the eyes of the commanders and the staffs. This monograph examines the evolution of staffs and of chiefs of staff to determine if staff control at the operational level generates consistent requirements for a chief of staff, and what qualities are expected of a chief of staff to successfully meet those requirements. It studies the contributions of Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff during World War II, to the concept of what the chief of staff at the operational level of war is supposed to be, know, and do. Doctrine is examined to determine if there are any shortfalls which need to be addressed with respect to the duties and authority of the chief of staff.

The monograph concludes that in order to execute proper control of joint and combined staffs and their functions, the current doctrine requires refinement in current staff arrangements to allow for greater staff flexibility in meeting requirements. Additionally, the approach to the authority granted the chiefs of staff should become permissive rather than restrictive, allowing them virtually to command the staff. Finally, those selected to serve as chiefs of staff must complement their commanders; each should be of the same service as his commander, and should perhaps be nominated for his position as chief of staff by his commander from a list of qualified candidates. In these ways, the commanders at the operational level of war will have chiefs of staff with whom they are more comfortable; who are more prepared doctrinally to assume the role; and who will maintain more positive control over staff operations.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACC	Air Component Commander
ACM	Air Chief Marshal (British Royal Air Force)
AEF	Allied Expeditionary Forces (WW I)
AFHQ	Allied Forces Headquarters (WW II, Europe)
AFSC	Armed Forces Staff College
ANSCOL	Army and Navy Staff College (Now AFSC)
AOR	Area of Operational Responsibility
AVM	Air Vice Marshal (British Royal Air Force)
CCS	Combined Chiefs of Staff (U.S. and British, WW II)
CGAAF	Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces (WW II)
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CINCAFFE	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Armed Forces, Far East (WW II)
CINCAFPAC	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific (WW II)
CINCEUR	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command
CINCLANT	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command
CINCPACAF	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Air Forces
CINCPOA	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (WW II)
CINCSAC	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Strategic Air Command
CNO	Chief, U.S. Naval Operations
COMUSMACV	Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
CSA	Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
DCINC	Deputy Commander-in-Chief
DOD	U.S. Department of Defense
ETOUSA	European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army
FM	Field Manual
FMEF	Fleet Marine Force Manual
FTP	Fleet Training Publication
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCS PUB	Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
MACOM	Major Army Command
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSD	Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SAC SWPA	Supreme Allied Commander, South West Pacific Area (WW II)
SBAFFA	Shore Based Air Forces Forward Area (WW II, Central Pacific)
SGS	Secretary to the General Staff
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (WW II, Europe)
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
TOC	Tactical Operations Center
UNC	United Nations Command
USAAF	United States Army Air Forces (WW II)
USAFE	United States Air Forces, Europe
USAREUR	United States Army Forces, Europe
USMAAG	United States Military Assistance and Advisory Group

I - INTRODUCTION

Staff control, as a concept, is relatively new in the conduct of warfare. Originally, staffs were small and served merely to convey the warlord's commands for the conduct of battle to his subordinate commanders. As armed forces grew in size and weapons and technology increased the complexity of orchestrating battle, the commander found that he needed a larger staff to control his forces. The formation of alliances and the addition of air forces and special operations forces to the force lists increased this complexity even further. The staff needed to be large enough to support the commander's vision for success by assisting in orchestrating the various parts of his force into a viable war machine. The large staff, however, could not usurp the commander's prerogative to command the forces. The staff therefore required someone to direct it in its mission of control of the means by which the commander fought the war. It needed what is known today as a chief of staff.

This monograph will examine the exercise of staff control by the chief of staff at the operational level of war. It will answer the following question: Does staff control at the operational level generate consistent requirements for a chief of staff, and what qualities are expected of a chief of staff to successfully meet those requirements?

This author uses a common paradigm in examining the thesis question. First, theoretical background establishes a basis for the model. The author then examines historical development of staff organizations and the position of chief of staff in U.S. force structure. A specific example of an operational level chief of staff, along with his staff organization and

control methods is then examined, in this case Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff in Europe during World War II. Survey data, collected from today's operational headquarters, lays the groundwork for analyzing the expectations of chiefs of staff in the modern age. The analysis also provides insight into the staff control needs for the near future, as well as implying what qualities constitute "the right stuff" for being a chief of staff for an operational level commander. Thus, the monograph focuses on *staff organization*, the chief of staff's *authority and role* in staff control, and the demands on the *man* serving as a chief of staff in modern war.

II - THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

In studying the application of command and control principles, one must understand the distinctions that exist between the definitions of *command* and *control*. Field Manual (FM) 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations* (1984), defines *command* as follows:

Command is the authority that a commander in the military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces to accomplish assigned missions¹.

This definition includes the main tenets of *command* as defined for DOD and NATO in JCS PUB 1, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*¹. The definition is adequate for the purposes of examination here; but what about *control*?

Control is not normally identified alone in military terms. JCS PUB 1 defines *control* in terms of a *limited* command relationship exercised by someone not in *full* command. FM 101-5 does not offer a definition of *control*, but does discuss *command and control* as an identifiable entity. It states:

Command and control is the process through which activities of military forces are directed, coordinated, and controlled to accomplish the mission³.

Webster's New World Dictionary defines *control* as "an apparatus to regulate a mechanism"⁴.

In Clausewitzian terms, *command* is the *means* by which the commander authorizes actions, and *control* is one of the *ways* in which he regulates the actions. Synthesizing from these definitions, then, one can conclude that a staff serves as the apparatus used by the commander to *control* the functions of the organization which he *commands*. As the organization grows in size and complexity, so grows the amount of details involved with the routine control of the organization. The commander cannot become so involved in the control of details that he has no time for the command of the organization. The accepted solution is to authorize subordinates to coordinate those actions necessary to free the commander from the burden of details. Thus, staff systems have developed over the years.

III - EVOLUTION OF STAFFS

Military staff systems date back as far as Philip of Macedonia and Alexander the Great. Indications from history are that they employed what we

today would call a supply officer, an engineer, an operations officer, and even a provost marshal. Later, Julius Caesar developed an intelligence system, further enhancing military organizations. Sophistication of military organizations declined after the Roman empire, and did not begin to recover until about the 14th and 15th centuries'. By the 16th century in continental Europe, the Prussian and French military reflected a resurgence of staff development, but along distinctly different patterns. The Prussians divided functional systems into two groupings: operations and administration. The French used four: administration, intelligence, operations, and supply. The British, later, adopted a modified Prussian approach, with a General (or "G") Staff controlling intelligence and operations and an Administrative/Quarter-master (or "A/Q") Staff for administration and supply. These European systems continued and matured on up to World War I'. The U.S., meanwhile, was experiencing difficulties in establishing a staff system.

The U.S. Continental Congress appointed George Washington to command the Continental Army. Then, reluctant to make the Army so formidable as to threaten liberty, they restricted the growth of a staff. Personally burdened by details, Washington requested establishment of a war office to relieve him of administrative requirements. In the years to follow, the Army, and later the Navy, were managed by boards and bureaus. No General Staff system existed until 1903 when then Secretary of War Elihu Root successfully urged Congress to support appropriate legislation. Root's design, with a Chief of Staff of the Army, troop commands, and a War Department manned by Bureau Chiefs, carried the Army until World War I'.

When General Pershing's American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) of World War I went to France, they initially trained and fought with the French. As the AEF was under the operational control of French Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Pershing felt obliged to adopt the French staff system of a Chief of Staff with four staff sections down to division level in order to facilitate coordination. To this basic French organization, Pershing added a fifth staff section charged with overseeing training of the AEF.

Pershing's World War I organization remained basically intact until the War ended. Two years later, Congress and the War Department adopted the recommendations of the Harbord Board study, establishing the War Department General Staff structure. The new structure called for the four basic "G" Staff sections, with a War Plans Division added.

The Army established the four-section staff organization down to battalion level, and fought World War II in that configuration. Though the War Department, and its successor, the Department of the Army, reconfigured after World War II, the old alignment remained intact for command levels from battalion up through Army Group¹. The Navy did not follow suit and had a wholly different staff organization. The war, however, created new situations of enormous size and scope for both the Army and the Navy.

World War II required a unified effort never before undertaken by either service. Ironically, the attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor, in large part, contributed to this situation. Investigating the attack, a joint committee of Congress determined that the previously accepted doctrine that unity of command could be exercised strictly through *mutual cooperation* was flawed. They recommended that a more *unified command* be required in all naval and military areas. Following the Congressional recommendation,

President Roosevelt designated the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet as commander of *a//* U.S. Armed Forces in the Hawaiian area on 17 December 1941. Following the establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in February 1942 and the agreements to work with the British to form the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) in March 1942, the JCS designated joint and combined area commands. This established joint command for U.S. Forces in all areas of the world. Where U.S. Forces fought with Allies, either the JCS, CCS, or other body of military agreement established combined commands⁹. The principles used were: decentralization; unity of command; and assignment of *supreme* direction to the service (U.S.) or nation (Allied) having primary concern in the area¹⁰. These first steps changed as necessary to facilitate a truly unified prosecution of the War.

One modification to the new system appeared in 1943. On 20 April of that year the JCS published Directive 263/2/D, entitled *Unified Command For U.S. Joint Operations*. This directive required unified commanders to treat all service components as members of a *single* command and *directed* them to establish *joint staffs*¹¹. Two solutions used are depicted in Appendix A to this monograph. The first shows the organization of the staff of Admiral Nimitz in his roles as Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) (commander of a U.S. service component), and Commander-in-Chief Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPOA) (commander of all U.S. Armed Forces in the theater); the second, General MacArthur's arrangements in the Far East. Unlike Nimitz, General MacArthur refused to form a joint staff. Instead, he used his all-U.S. Army Staff in his roles as Commander-in-Chief U.S. Army Forces Pacific (CINCAFPAC) (commander of a U.S. service component), Commander-in-Chief United States Armed Forces Far East (USAFFE) (containing some of all U.S. service

components), and Supreme Allied Commander South West Pacific Area (SAC SWPA) (an Allied command)'. For theaters where Allied Forces would be engaged, combined staffs were supposed to be formed through international agreements, accounting for Allied sensitivities. An example of Eisenhower's combined staff for SHAEF during Operation OVERLORD also appear in Appendix A, depicting the integrated (what some called "layered") and parallel combinations used in constituting the combined staff. Another new element, air power, was emerging at the same time.

As the air dimension became more important in warfighting, the air forces began to attain some autonomy in their actions. While the depictions of the task organization for OVERLORD show separate lines for the Tactical Air Forces and the Strategic Air Forces, there were separate command arrangements for them as well. All United States Army Air Force elements worked for General H. H. Arnold in Washington. While Eisenhower had operational command of Allied Tactical Air Forces, he had only strategic direction for U.S. Strategic Air Forces, which Arnold still commanded. Arnold led the battle for recognition of the Army Air Force as a separate service, and the Strategic Air Forces developed a General Staff structure like that of the Army Ground Forces. The U.S. Tactical Air Forces had the basic four-section staff arrangement (called A-1 through A-4), but they did not use a chief of staff. This was based on the idea that tactical fighters fought in support of ground plans coordinated under the guidance of a ground force chief of staff, with Army Air Force officers effecting liaison during planning and execution'. This, however, posed interesting problems for air forces working in maritime theaters of operations.

In spite of newly found autonomy and a cooperative atmosphere among other services and Allies in Europe, Army Air Forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas were frequently in dispute with the Naval Aviation Forces. Admiral Nimitz, in his role as CINCPAC, in April 1944, solved part of this problem when he issued a directive to form a joint air staff to support Major General Willis Hale, USAAF, in his command of Shore Based Air Forces Forward Area. The staff of SBAFFA consisted of officers from the Army, Navy, and the Marines and coordinated actions for Hale in his role as the Air Component Commander (ACC) for the Commander Forward Area Central Pacific. Appendix A contains a diagram of the staff organization. As his chief of staff, Hale appointed an Army Air Force Colonel. He chose a Navy Captain as the deputy chief of staff, and alternated between Army (G1 and G3) and Navy (G2 and G4) for the rest of his staff'. It can be seen that this "layered" arrangement follows a model promoted and used in unified and combined commands both during and after World War II.

Near the end of the War, in June 1945, the Army and Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) drafted a change to Chapter II of the *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* (as it was known by the Army), or Fleet Training Publication [FTP] 155 (as it was known by the Navy). The JCS accepted this change and published it as doctrine for coordination between the Army and the Navy. Under the section dealing with unified command, the document emphasizes two major points:

- (1) The commander of a joint force will not function in the dual capacity of commander of such force and commander of a subordinate unit thereof, unless so directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the authority constituting the joint force.

(2) The commander of a joint force will provide himself with a joint staff of appropriate size. This joint staff will include representatives of the several components of this joint force in such a manner as to insure [sic] an understanding of tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs and limitations of such component parts'.

The document went on to propose a staff organization, but did not attempt to dictate the specific service breakout of staff membership. They recommended, however, that the chief of staff and the deputy chief of staff be of *different services* and that each staff section be manned by officers of both *services*'. This first major study of unified command may have been approved as doctrine, but it took a bitter U.S. inter-service rivalry to bring about unified command in fact.

The Army and the Navy differed over command relationships existing in the Post-World War II Pacific areas. The Navy favored a unified command over the entire Pacific area, whose commander would have a joint staff. Fearful that the Navy would gain control of Army and Air Forces currently under the control of General MacArthur, the Army opposed the plan. Debate on the issues of that region caused the JCS to develop a system of worldwide unified command. President Truman approved the *Outline Command Plan* on 14 December 1946, thereby establishing seven unified commands: Far East Command, Pacific Command, Alaskan Command, Northeast Command, Atlantic Fleet, Caribbean Command, and European Command. The Plan also recognized Strategic Air Command (SAC) as a separate entity, but gave it no specific mission. These commands would receive strategic direction from the JCS, with the chief of the major service of interest in the region serving as executive agent for the command (CSA, CNO, CGAAF). The JCS directed that the unified commands follow the *Joint Action of the Army and Navy* (FTP-155) guidance.

Specifically, each unified commander would establish a *joint staff*, integrating members of all services under the commands for intelligence, operations, and plans. Other functions of supply and administration would remain service-specific. JCS added responsibility for coordinating administrative and logistic support to the unified commanders following increased tensions and expansion of CINCEUR's mission in 1948. This approach, with several modifications, brought about truly unified commands employing joint U.S. forces and staffs. The JCS was burdened only with directing the Military Governor of Germany in his relationships with the Allies, until the requirements for *combined* command doctrine and for "multi-hat" commanders emerged with the conflict in Korea in 1950¹.

In 1950, General MacArthur received command of United Nations Command (UNC), directing U.N. Allied Forces in dealing with the Korean War. Simultaneously, as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Forces Far East, he had component commanders for Far East Air Forces and Naval Forces Far East, while he retained command of Army Forces Far East. Thus he wore three hats. In exercising his commands, he used his U.S. Army staff, augmented by a joint plans cell, which included U.N. liaison representatives². When he was relieved, a truly joint staff formed to replace the old arrangement, combining U.N. representation in critical areas. The need for combined command was not limited to Korea, however³.

In 1951, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) was established with operational command of all U.S. Forces, and those of participating Allies, in Europe. He also became Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command (USCINCEUR), expanding to include U.S. Forces in the Mediterranean and U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE). JCS directed him to establish a U.S.

headquarters with a joint staff and a Deputy. The old European Command became U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR)**. One notes the increased use of multi-hat CINCs at this point, in spite of the discouragement of this practice by FTP-155.

Throughout the 1950s and into the early 1960s, the structures for the unified, specified, and combined commands matured. International defense agreements and crises requiring unilateral U.S. responses during these years created requirements for continuous reexamination of the world-wide command structure of U.S. forces. The Presidents, DOD, and JCS in these years removed some of the geographical inconsistencies, and removed single-service secretaries and chiefs from executive agent status in the commands. The chain of command began to run from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the CINCs, with the JCS serving in advisory roles. At the CINC level, more multi-hat positions came into acceptance. Commands which had been managed primarily by one service increasingly found joint staffing necessary. For example, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 identified shortfalls in CINCLANT's mostly-Navy orientation, which the JCS corrected by authorizing more permanent mutiservice staff billets in that command¹. Unity of command, with its accompanying requirement for truly joint staffing, began to affirm itself as the practice of the modern era, until Vietnam.

In 1962, the Vietnam conflict expanded, requiring sufficient command and staff elements to justify a new unified command. Accepting objections from the JCS and CINCPAC to a *separate* unified command, the Secretary of Defense agreed that the Commander of U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (COMUSMACV) would be a *subunified* command under CINCPAC. Initially, USMACV coordinated efforts by service elements designated *in support of* its effort.

Later, Naval and Air Component Commanders joined USMACV to assist with Navy river patrols and USAF air strikes within Vietnam. No Army Component Commander was designated as COMUSMACV was dual-hatted in that role. To complicate command and staff arrangements further, CINCPACAF controlled USAF elements in Vietnam and CINCPAC retained control of Pacific Fleet assets providing naval aviation and gunfire support to COMUSMACV. When B-52s began bombing North Vietnam, they were commanded by CINCSAC, with targeting approved by CINCPAC and the Pentagon¹¹. Unity of command went on hold for awhile.

By the late 1960s, the supposedly unified command structure began to show disturbing weaknesses. Between 1969 and 1970, a Presidential Blue Ribbon Panel determined that the combatant commands were excessively layered and still suffered from service parochialism. The Panel's evidence showed the *ad hoc* nature of both planning and staff and command organization for every major crisis within the previous decade. They recommended consolidation of some commands, and, most notably, that service component commanders be designated *deputy commanders* of the unified commands to which their service elements were assigned or in support. DOD took no action on the Panel's recommendations¹².

In the face of the winding down of the Vietnam conflict and streamlining measures in DOD, JCS began to disregard the cogent recommendations of decades of study regularly. Many commands were consolidated and the commanders multi-hatted. The Army led the way by using this technique in Panama, Alaska, and the Pacific. In 1975, the Secretary of Defense requested and the President approved massive cuts in headquarters staffs, negating the initial efforts of staff layering which had, in fact, been the mechanism for true jointness¹³.

Many shifts in areas and forces took place in the late 1970s and the 1980s, most notably the creation of U.S. Central Command for the Middle East, U.S. Special Operations Command supporting all warfighting CINCs with Special Operations Forces, and U.S. Transportation Command designed to consolidate support for deployment of forces to all areas of the world. No major effort was made to resurrect layered joint staff arrangements which had proved so successful in Europe in World War II until the Goldwater-Nichols amendment to the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This legislation required, among other things, joint duty by all U.S. commissioned officers to qualify for flag rank.

After lessons learned in a major conflict, supported by studies in the following years, it took Congressional action to get the services to support joint staff arrangements in the unified commands. The deliberations within DOD continue today over how to comply with the legislation or change its provisions. At the unified commands, the commanders and chiefs of staff try to deal with these issues while conducting their day-to-day missions. In some commands, the chiefs of staff are better prepared to meet these challenges than others. Their relative freedom of action, either through their experiences, personalities, or relationships with the commanders, varies due to inconsistent or nonexistent doctrine for staff alignment and the authority of the chief of staff. It would benefit all, therefore, to study the development of the position of chief of staff in order to determine what role he should play at the operational level.

IV - EVOLUTION OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

In 18th Century Germany, following the years of Frederick the Great, military reforms resulted in the creation of the Office of Quartermaster General. He acted in the role that we associate today with the Chief of Staff of the Army. By the 19th Century he had become unique, in that he was not a staff supervisor, but in fact exercised almost joint authority with the commander, and was empowered to make major decisions. He directed the General Staff Corps, who were well-educated, outstanding young officers positioned in all of the Prussian tactical units' headquarters. This served to ensure that control of actions desired by the King or the Quartermaster General was uniformly maintained. The Quartermaster General thus was a formidable figure in Prussian military society, capable of arraying Prussian armed might against any of Prussia's European enemies, many of whom had recently been her allies in defeating France under Napoleon Bonaparte.

Napoleon had inherited a revolutionary army that had previously undergone many changes in structure and staff development. Thanks to improved standards of French staff work developed in the late 18th Century, Napoleon could put his plans for the French *Grande Armee* into motion quite easily through use of the talents of his chief of staff, Marshal Berthier. Berthier was a master of administration and staff routine. He *commanded* the Imperial Headquarters and managed staff sections divided into a four-section arrangement similar to ours today¹.

In the latter part of the 19th Century, Helmuth Moltke became prominent in the Prussian Army. As Chief of the Army General Staff, he was empowered by the King to issue orders directly to field commanders. This reflected the

continued practice, in the Prussian model, of allowing the Chief of the Army General Staff to be virtually a co-commander with the Commander-in-Chief, in this case the King. This remained so into World War I, as practiced by Falkenhayn and Hindenburg, and by 1918, the power of the Chief of the Army General Staff reached its zenith. Corresponding authority existed in the positions of the chiefs of staff of the German field armies and corps¹⁶. These chiefs of staff presided over a mature staff system unmatched by their U.S. Army adversaries.

As mentioned earlier, the introduction of a General Staff, much less a chief of staff, in the U.S. Army did not take place until shortly before World War I. Pershing instituted chiefs of staff down to the division level. While they directed staff activities, they had nowhere near the authority of their German counterparts. Even though the position was now permanently established in the U.S. Army force structure, what would chiefs of staff be required to be, know, and do?

Doctrinal specifics about staff functions and principles under the U.S. Army General Staff system of the 1920s clearly followed the rule that the commander commanded and the staff did not. The 1928 *Staff Officers' Field Manual* stated the following:

The commander...although he may be provided with a staff to relieve him of the burden of details ...cannot avoid his responsibility for all policies, plans, or basic decisions which affect...his command¹⁷.

It goes on to describe staff authority by stating:

A staff officer, as such, has no authority to command. *All* policies, basic decisions, and plans, whether originating with the commander or with his subordinates, must be authorized by the commander *before* they are put into effect [author's italics]¹⁸.

The past experiences of the U.S. Army left it with a heritage of commanders who were rather autocratic and who were unwilling to relinquish much of their authority to their staffs. Influences inevitably left by the French in World War I probably reinforced this nature. Congress probably appreciated this as well, as it ensured that power was not being distributed in such a manner that the Army could get out of control. Thus, a system such as that of the Prussian or German Armies, giving greater authority to their chiefs of staff proved unacceptable to U.S. sensitivities. Specifically, the chief of staff of any U.S. Army headquarters authorized a general staff, was doctrinally described as an assistant and advisor.

The 1928 manual authorized a commander to have a chief of staff (at division level and higher) and a deputy chief of staff (at army level and higher). The Chief of Staff's general duties read as follows:

The chief of staff...is the principal assistant and adviser [sic] of the commander. He transmits the will of the commander to those who execute it and is the principal coordinating agency which insures [sic] the efficient functioning of the staff and of all troops of the command¹⁰.

Evidently, later authors of doctrine tried to prevent staff officers from being permanent headquarters residents, with no time for troop duty. The 1932 manual stated that staff officers should have "full, first-hand knowledge of and sympathetic acquaintance with subordinate... units¹¹." In the 1932 edition, the description of the chief of staff's position, as quoted above, and his specific duties remained unchanged from the 1928 edition. His specific duties were: establishing staff procedures and policies; keeping the commander abreast of the friendly and enemy situations; preparing estimates of the situation; representing the commander when authorized;

coordinating staff actions to translate the commander's decisions into plans and orders; ensuring issuance of policies and orders which fulfill commander's policy and intent; by personal observation, monitoring execution of orders and plans; continuously monitoring the current situation with a view for future operations or contingencies; and forwarding staff reports to higher headquarters¹. Subtle changes began to appear after the 1932 version.

Changes to the 1940 version of the *Staff Officers' Field Manual* implied that the chief of staff should be more concerned with the command as a whole, rather than just with staff functions. The new manual, now designated Field Manual (FM) 101-5, *Staff Officers' Field Manual: The Staff and Combat Orders*, stated that the chief of staff was the:

...principal assistant and advisor to the commander. He may transmit the decisions of the commander to appropriate staff officers for preparation, or transmit them in the form of orders [directly] to those who execute them. He is the principal coordinating agency of the command².

It still, however, did not specify the authority of the chief of staff with respect to the staff or subordinate commands. As the manual was worded, the general staff was not required to go through the chief of staff in dealings with the commander. This is the doctrine which the Army carried to war in 1941.

Eisenhower's Chief of Staff at Allied Forces Headquarters in 1942, Major General Mark W. Clark, altered this. He demanded, with Eisenhower's approval, that *all* coordination between the general and special staff and the commander be routed through the chief of staff. In effect, Clark, and later Walter Bedell Smith, *commanded* the staff of AFHQ, which grew to 4,070

personnel by autumn in 1943³³. The AFHQ Chief of Staff's regular duties appear in the *History of AFHQ*:

- (1) To act as the executive of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.
- (2) To direct and co-ordinate the General and Special Staff Sections of AFHQ.
- (3) To exercise general supervision of planning and of the operations in the field.

During the formation of AFHQ, the Chief's duties also included:

- (1) To co-ordinate Allied Army, Naval, and Air Staffs of AFHQ.
- (2) To approve, along with G-1, all additional requests to the War Department for personnel.
- (3) To be the normal channel by which AC's of S and chiefs of sections communicate with the Commander-in-Chief³⁴.

Naval and Air Staffs mirrored the AFHQ Staff, and later the SHAEF Staff, in arrangement of duties. Smith, however, insisted that "the three staffs [ground, air, sea] be brought into complete contact and complete integration in the fields of Intelligence and of Planning³⁵." The integration of Allies also appeared in the fields of intelligence and planning, as well as current operations. To contend with Civil-Military Operations and the post-war Military Government of Occupied Germany, SHAEF created an integrated G-5 staff³⁶. As in U.S. joint service arrangements, personnel and logistics were not integrated in the Allied staff structure, but were required to be as balanced as possible in Allied representation within the staff leadership and be parallel in nature in execution³⁷. Whether integrated or parallel, though, the staff sections were still under the *direct authority* of the AFHQ Chief of Staff. These methods of staff operation and function established the general pattern by which chiefs of staffs and their counterparts would be

expected, hopefully, to function in joint and combined commands of the post-war era.

After the war, however, U.S. Army doctrine dispensed with the organization and functional successes established in AFHQ and SHAEF. The 1950 version of FM 101-5 kept the chief of staff from having direct authority over the staff. It returned him to the duties specified in the 1928, 1932, and 1940 versions, but made a few concessions in authority. He could now issue warning orders directly to subordinate commands. Additionally, the general and special staff members were now required to brief the chief after the fact on any information or recommendations they gave to the commander or instructions they received from the commander. It placed the burden on the chief of staff to inquire of the commander concerning new information, instructions, or recommendations received by the commander from higher or subordinate headquarters. He also gained the requirement for establishing liaison with higher, adjacent, lower, and supported unit headquarters, while he supervised the war room¹⁴. The 1950 version was inattentive to the challenges of joint and combined headquarters staff organizations or functions.

The absence of a joint or combined flavor to the 1950 manual can be understood, but not excused, because of the situation at the time. General MacArthur's headquarters in the Far East was the only one involved in major warfighting. His staff was virtually all-U.S. Army, coordinating all U.S. and United Nations Ground, Naval, and Air Forces, mainly through liaison and operations staffs. The only organizations studying and recommending truly joint and combined staff organizations and functions were the Staff Colleges and War Colleges.

The previously-mentioned study by the Army and Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) in 1945 established joint procedures and command and staff arrangements which matched the unified command feelings of the U.S. military establishment. Near the end of World War II, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had determined that unified command arrangements would remain in effect in all U.S. overseas commands. To that end, the ANSCOL's study changed the Joint Actions of the Army and Navy (FTP-155). It deemphasized service parochialism and established the chief of staff as *the* supervisor and director of the joint staff in the cases of joint overseas expeditions¹.

In spite of efforts to unify procedures and institutions during the 1950s and 1960s, the Army held to certain traditions. The 1960 version of FM 101-5 did not change significantly from the 1950 edition, except that the paragraphs discussing the *deputy* chief of staff, whose duties were listed in the editions up to 1950, disappeared. In 1968, the new edition of FM 101-5 stated that the "commander commands the staff, but the chief of staff directs and supervises it¹." It went on to contradict itself by stating that the chief of staff is "the senior member and the *head* of the staff. He is responsible for the execution of staff tasks and the efficient response of staff members...The commander *may* delegate to him authority that amounts to command of the staff [author's italics]¹." Specifically, while he retained the duties of previous editions, the requirement for personal observation of the completion of staff actions was omitted and responsibility for direction of the tactical operations center (TOC) was added. Highlighting needs for joint and combined *command* considerations, the manual did not go into detail on joint or combined *staff organizations or functions*¹. The 1972 edition of FM 101-5 did not change this¹. The 1984 edition did depict diagrams of

suggested joint and combined staff organizations, but made no attempt at describing depths of functions; nor did it alter the chief of staff's duties or increase his authority'. Thus, the Army remained ambiguous in its descriptions of what it was trying to accomplish in the area of staff control procedures and the role of the chief of staff.

Institutions do not change easily, as the preceding discussions show. In spite of successful employment of sound staff procedures and establishment of an authoritative role for the Chief of Staff in such headquarters as AFHQ, and later SHAEF, the Army has continued to return to parochial practices. Perhaps a more thorough examination of the man who created the successes in AFHQ and SHAEF might be valuable in attempting to break this deadlock in ideas. With this in mind, we shall examine the performance of Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff to Eisenhower during World War II.

V - WALTER BEDELL SMITH

In June 1942, General George C. Marshall notified Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower that he had been selected to be the Commanding General of the European Theater of Operations of the U.S. Army (ETOUSA) and Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ). Aware that he would need an exceptional chief of staff, Eisenhower asked for Brigadier General Walter Bedell Smith.

Smith had been one of General Marshall's favorites since meeting him at a briefing at Fort Benning in 1931. Smith also knew the Washington scene, as he had served as Secretary of the General Staff (SGS) in the War Department. In that capacity, he became intimate with the establishment of the Joint

Actions of the Army and Navy, a program which was to pave the way to the future establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He helped organize the Secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which was an Anglo-American forerunner to the current SHAPE Headquarters in Europe¹¹.

Arriving in Europe, Smith was confronted with three major challenges: planning for the invasion of North Africa, codenamed Operation TORCH; creating an Allied staff for TORCH with assets from the ETOUSA staff; and orchestrating the command and control arrangements for U.S. forces arriving in England. Of these three, the most critical one for Smith was the creation of an Allied staff.

Smith knew that a major hurdle lay ahead in defining the nature of his own position as chief of staff. The chief of staff was a relatively new entity in U.S. formations, having only been sanctioned since World War I in division and higher headquarters. With few U.S. Army officers experienced in managing large staff operations, Smith was reasonably free to wield his authority over his staff as he saw fit. He took advantage of the ambiguously worded Army doctrinal manual, FM 101-5, dated August 1940, to support this position.

Smith knew that U.S. Army doctrine was inadequate to deal with other-than-Army problems. It did not address Air and Naval concerns sufficiently. It paid scant attention to civil affairs and public affairs issues. Additionally, and most importantly, it did not prepare Smith for the large scale of staff operations he was about to face, especially in light of the Allied nature of the staff¹². Only a special kind of officer with a background and temperament like Smith's could have handled the job as well.

Smith's background involved service in infantry command and staff assignments, staff time under General Marshall at the Infantry School, attendance at the Army War College, and the Washington assignments indicated above. He saw things from the perspective of a combat leader, but with a broader view than most of his contemporaries. He also possessed some important personal talents. He could recognize talent in young officers and tap them for maximum efficiency. A persuasive speaker, he was able to communicate effectively and succinctly. He was intelligent and decisive, with a keen eye for critical details. These qualities aided him in establishing his credibility, not only with U.S. officers, but with their British counterparts in the Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ).

Going to great lengths to employ British officers to the fullest in AFHQ, Smith freely employed the technique of *layering* in establishing the AFHQ staff. In almost every case, British section chiefs had U.S. deputies and *vice versa*. Once this was accomplished, Smith emphasized stability in the position. In fact, many of his AFHQ staff in 1943 moved with him to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) when it was formed in 1944. By this time they had experienced the North African, Sicilian, and Italian campaigns, and were well-prepared for the task ahead, OVERLORD'. The forced entry into continental Europe would test Smith, Eisenhower, and their relationship.

Eisenhower maintained more of a professional relationship with Smith than a personal one. At first, they had tried to socialize frequently, but their personalities led them to adopt a more exclusively professional arrangement. This personal incompatibility did not impair professional collaboration between the two men'.

Eisenhower thoroughly trusted Smith's judgement on most matters, such as assignment of key personnel. He would routinely discuss the advancement and placement of senior officers with Smith and seek his opinion, even on officers senior to Smith. He allowed Smith to have a free hand in his style of staff management in AFHQ¹.

Smith held a staff conference daily with key members. This was normally informal in nature, followed by a more formal session with Eisenhower, the deputy commander, allied deputy chiefs of staff, and air and naval staff representatives. He trusted each staff member to be a master in his area, but demanded a "doctrine of no surprises". Thus, conferences served as Smith's primary tool of staff control.

Based on his experiences as SGS at the War Department, Smith realized that another valuable tool lay in the SGS. This element served as the chief of staff's own staff. The SGS was charged with performing tasks which were of immediate interest to the chief of staff and the commander. He was also required to maintain the good reputation of the headquarters with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and with subordinate headquarters. His specific duties included handling visitors, preparing staff studies, ensuring message and record control for the command group, and analyzing command statistics.

Smith went out of his way to establish informal channels of communication and coordination with subordinate headquarters, as well as with the U.S. War Department and the British War Office. This was crucial at the time, as AFHQ was one of the first major wartime endeavors by modern allied forces under the unified command of an officer from one of the member nations. Disagreements were unavoidable, but Smith believed that informal resolutions would lead to overall better understanding among the Allies².

Within the AFHQ staff, Smith directly influenced many decisions. While he expected the staff to deal with routine issues, he personally imposed himself on matters which were critical to the command. In these cases, he stayed with each issue until it was acceptably resolved. Often these issues would extend to Allied as well as national "suggestions" or desires.

Smith's experience at the War Department served him well in dealing with U.S. interests. He knew most of the major personalities in Washington, and, by keen observation and discreet inquiry, learned his way around London. Thus, he became well known and respected by the major British personalities, all the way up to Churchill.

His political sensitivities were matched only by his tenacity in planning and execution of combat operations in the theater. In addition to running Eisenhower's daily staff updates, Smith often accompanied the commander to the headquarters of his subordinates commanders during the course of major operations. Here, he would talk directly with his counterparts, and sometimes the commanders themselves. Consequently, he knew enough about the situation in the command, and Eisenhower's feelings about how combat operations should go, that he was quite capable of making decisions in Eisenhower's name in the commander's absence. With the approach of OVERLORD, these absences became more frequent as Eisenhower visited units and Allied political leaders. During those times, Smith personally managed the war. Sometimes, competing demands on Eisenhower's time led him to dispatch Smith to represent him to such people as the President, the Prime Minister, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which gives further evidence of Eisenhower's confidence in him¹¹.

Eisenhower's great trust in Smith was matched by the authority to exercise that trust. Smith channeled all staff directives from the commander to the staff and recommendations from the staff to the commander. Knowing the commander's intent as well as he did, in most cases Smith decided all but the most important issues, minimizing the amount of details passed directly by Eisenhower. This was implied by his charter as chief of staff, as recorded in the *History of AFHQ*¹¹. The prudent exercise of the commander's trust and his proven value as a leader, administrator, and international coordinator marked Smith as a man destined for bigger things. This came to pass after the War, when he was appointed to replace Averell Harriman as ambassador to the Soviet Union, and later became Director of Central Intelligence¹².

General Smith's post-war prestige should not cause one to overlook his contributions to staff control methods in a warfighting headquarters. One must admire his diligent acquisition and exercise of authority as a chief of staff at the operational level. Even though General Smith's doctrinal precedents were largely overtaken by parochial sentiments and budgetary considerations following World War II, they established an authoritative set of guidelines from which modern and future operational headquarters could learn a great deal.

VI - THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND STAFF CONTROL IN THE MODERN AGE

Views differ widely on the roles and duties of chiefs of staff of modern headquarters. This assertion is substantiated by responses of various operational commanders and chiefs of staff to a survey conducted by this

author of the Army corps and armies, major Air Force and Navy commands, the U.S. specified and unified commands, and the U.S. components to allied commands. The survey, with responses, appears as Appendix B to this monograph and serves to indicate the current thinking in the force. While the survey answers questions about views on the chief's role and duties, one must concurrently analyze the organizational structure within which today's chief of staff must operate.

Doctrine for staff organization and control in the joint and combined arena has not been formalized. While precedents have been established for dealing with conventional warfighting organizations in the past, they have not always been followed later, as noted previously. The rise in unconventional warfare situations also challenges doctrine in addressing optimal structures and control arrangements. Using the historical examples of the CINCPAC staff under Nimitz and the SHAEF staff under Eisenhower, perhaps some useful patterns may be developed.

One may see basic patterns depicted in the cases described below and shown graphically in Appendix C. The three cases studied here are: U.S. unilateral action employing a joint force under a unified command; multilateral action involving U.S. elements in a combined force action; and low intensity conflict involving U.S. assistance to a developing ally or allies. In examining these cases, this author uses the original guidance published in 1946 by the JCS: unified command by a commander not also commanding a component of the command; service component forces commanded by officers of their respective components; joint staffs filled by an appropriate representation of each service; and the retaining of responsibilities for administration, service-specific training, supply, and

funding by each service³. Where combined actions are involved, the terms *combined* and *allies* replace *joint* and *services*, respectively.

In the first case (see page C-1), one sees joint action by two or more services, as expected in modern warfighting. The CINC exercises unified command, as is prescribed by the above guidelines, with a truly joint staff to assist him. The CINC and his chief of staff are of the same service, sharing similar experiences, and thus sharing the commander's vision. The same can be said of the relationship between the DCINC and the deputy chief of staff. They share common service experiences, although different from the CINC and chief of staff, and stand poised to assume command and control of a subunified command or joint task force. The structure depicted supports transition as well. For example, in a case requiring forced entry, the CINC could be a Naval officer, commanding the forces en route. Once a lodgement forms, his Deputy, an Army, Marine, or Air Force officer might assume command of the forces ashore. The joint staff would already be configured and the control of the staff would fall to the new subunified command chief of staff. The multi-hat requirements of the CINC, DCINC, chief of staff, and deputy chief of staff are minimized. Prior to transition, the deputy chief of staff focuses on *future* operations, those which *his* staff will be coordinating. This frees the chief of staff to focus on deployment, current operations, logistics, and protection measures of the forces *en route*. While completely joint staff arrangements are ideal, the personnel and logistics arrangements peculiar to each service must be continued in parallel, with joint oversight by J1 and J4 section chiefs, along with deputies from the other services involved. Addition of more deputy chiefs of staff to minimize the chief of staff's span of control and increase his efficiency must not

delay critical coordination caused by additional horizontal layers of control.

The second case (see page C-2) depicts combined command and staff arrangements which mirror the principles established for the unilateral U.S. force in Case 1. Intelligence, operations, and plans sections are completely integrated, as in Case 1. The national services' personnel and logistics systems operate parallel with combined section leadership, meaning that if the section chief is of one nationality, then his deputy with equal rank is of the other. Nation 1 in this case is that nation with the largest contribution to the overall effort. Nation 2, is the one with the next largest stake in the outcome of the alliance or conflict. It might also be the ally being supported in a just cause by Nation 1. As in Case 1, the SAC and his chief of staff are of the same service as well as the same nationality. So are the DSAC and the deputy chief of staff (who may be one of several deputies). This facilitates flexibility in the case of transitions between phases of operations in the theater and allows for change of focus by one party, in the event of change in national policy by that party's political leadership, without necessarily endangering the whole enterprise. These two cases demonstrate ideal ways to ensure proper alignment within the staff of the commander's vision for conducting a *conventional* campaign by virtue of the presence of a chief of staff who can readily identify with that vision and intent. A case involving *unconventional* warfare or low intensity conflict (LIC) should also be studied to see if such an arrangement is also required.

The third case (see page C-3), involving a LIC scenario, demonstrates a crucial need for clear understanding of commander's intent and vision by the chief of staff. In this case, the commander of the subunified command works directly for the U.S. *political* leadership in the form of the U.S. Ambassador or the Under Secretary for the Region, and may be exposed to political culpability if things go poorly. The focus in the diagram is the chief of staff of the subunified command. He is multi-hatted in his staff control mission, but within reason. His other hat is that of deputy chief of staff of the parent unified command. In country, he has *at least one Allied* deputy chief of staff who is of the same service and nationality as the Allied deputy commander. This facilitates the assumption of the internal security and/or development mission for the region or country in the event of the withdrawal of the U.S. elements. His staff sections are layered in the same manner as the conventional warfighting headquarters, except that his staff is larger. The different facets of internal security, development, and support of the recognized government or governments of the region require more diverse staff specialists in order to carry out the command's mission effectively. The USMAAG chief, while depicted *in liaison* with the State Department representatives, actually serves as another deputy chief of staff during its mission in the region or country. In a better position than any other military or naval staff element to understand the critical needs of the region or country, the USMAAG chief reports directly to the ambassador or the State Department representatives upon withdrawal of the command from the region or country. Until withdrawal, though, the USMAAG chief aids in staff control by providing his element's unique view in the development of plans and operations. Now that we have seen how a chief of staff and his deputies

can be positioned in order to yield the greatest contribution for the commander, let us look at the requirements of the position.

As discussed previously, doctrine writers have not clearly stated the authority which the chief of an operational headquarters should routinely possess. Formulating new doctrine for the chief of staff's duties and authority requires careful consideration in order to avoid usurping command prerogatives.

Specifically, *the chief of staff must regulate staff operations within the command in accordance with regulations.* This requires his establishing and maintaining staff policies and standard operating procedures (SOPs); allocating staff resources in accomplishing tasks not covered by doctrine, law, or policy; and monitoring the flow of staff actions and reports to and from subordinate, lateral, and higher headquarters. These actions follow the trend of requirements in the past doctrinal publications, except that they are placed together under one specific mission¹¹.

The chief of staff should *represent the commander or commander-in-chief (CINC) in his absence or in the absence of the Deputy, with authority to make decisions except in the most critical areas.* This is a departure from normal practice. Current doctrine allows the chief of staff to represent the commander only when authorized¹². Intensity and diversity of activities expected in modern and future operational commands will undoubtedly tax the commander's, or CINC's, ability to stay personally available at all times. If his vision for the command and his intent for the campaign have been clearly stated to his subordinates, then the chief of staff, in the absence of the deputy, can readily represent the commander's position in almost all command matters and should rarely be restricted in doing this.

The chief of staff *should serve as the normal channel by which staff elements communicate with the command group.* The current doctrine not only allows for the staff to bypass the chief of staff in dealings with the command group, it places the burden on the chief of staff to obtain backbriefs from the staff who exercise this practice¹⁷. Precedent for establishing him as the staff focal point for communicating with the command group exists in the records of AFHQ of World War II¹⁸.

The chief of staff should *exercise general supervision of staff planning and of operations in the field or afloat.* He should also *direct the operations of the primary command center.* These are accepted practices currently.

Finally, the chief of staff should *inform the commander, or CINC, of the situation and of staff recommendations; translate the commander's, or CINC's, decision into staff and command guidance; and alert the command, issuing preparation orders in the commander's, or CINC's, name.* This duty and authority implies that the chief of staff could issue movement orders for subordinate elements to place them in position to execute future phases of an operation or to prepare for a contingency. This is a large change in function over the past, but it fulfils the idea of understanding and carrying out commander's intent. Thus, the chief of staff exercises greater authority under the above guidelines, but what of the deputy chief of staff?

Provision should be made for at least one deputy chief of staff at an operational level headquarters. This has been previously addressed, but his duties need to be itemized. He should *maintain higher, lateral, and lower liaison.* Further, he should *integrate, in proportion to their contribution to or impact on the command, all service and international staff*

representation into staff operations of the command. Since the deputy chief of staff is probably of another service or nationality than the commander, or CINC, and his chief of staff, the deputy possesses a better feel for the needs of the other participants. He can therefore provide critical insights into national or service-peculiar positions or the level of participation of air, ground, or naval forces. Additionally, he should *assist the chief of staff in supervising staff planning and operations, focusing on future operations and contingencies.* This divides the staff supervisory workload for current and future operations between the chief of staff and him. If the command has no deputy chief of staff, these duties would fall to the chief of staff. Now, let us consider what kind of man is required to carry out the tasks of the chief of staff.

Today's operational commanders and chiefs of staff have varied opinions about what constitutes "the right stuff" in filling the chief of staff's billet in their commands. The survey mentioned earlier, and reported in Appendix B, describes the chief of staff in terms of: the man, his duties, his relationship to the commander, his control over the staff and its orchestration, his influence on decisions, and expectations for the future.

The majority believe that the man holding the position of chief of staff of an operational level headquarters should have a master's degree. He should also have completed a senior service college. In spite of educational needs, the chief of staff must first and foremost be a master of his combat trade, be that soldier, sailor, airman, or marine. To achieve this, he must have actively sought out the difficult duty positions, such as command of a battalion, a ship, or a squadron, and the really tough staff assignments. Survey respondents almost all indicated that he must know the organization

and missions of the command in which he will serve as chief of staff and that his background should complement the commander's. The most desired skills of a chief of staff are those of communication, organization, and leadership.

Regardless of his background and abilities, a chief of staff faces major challenges. He must coordinate the efforts of joint and combined staff elements; oversee staff operations in peacetime with an eye for war; balance needs against resources in implementing the commander's, or CINC's, policies and directives; and overcome branch, service, or national parochialism in the command. His degree of freedom to meet these challenges varies with the command in which he may serve. While the commander *commands* the unit, the chief of staff *runs* it in some cases. Often, though, the absence of doctrinal insight into what his authority should be leaves him in conflict with his boss over the nature of his position. This causes difficulties, especially when dealing with other services or allies. A lot of these difficulties can be overcome if the chief of staff is of the same service as the commander, thus minimizing the communications difficulties between them.

Most of today's commanders and CINCs desire both a personal and professional relationship with their chiefs of staff. This kind of relationship is better supported when both have come up through the same service. The better their relationship, the more trust the commander can place in the his chief of staff. This can be crucial in determining the level of involvement of the chief of staff in selecting staff members.

The majority of incumbents maintain formal staff control measures. They rely on formal conferences and briefings as opposed to informal gatherings or working luncheons. Most who have a staff secretary use him as a key element

in staff control, charging him with maintaining a reputation of efficient headquarters operations, conducting liaison with subordinate staffs, or, in one case "management by walking around". Whether he uses the staff secretary or not, the degree of liaison conducted *personally* between the headquarters and subordinates by the chief of staff seems to diminish from lower level operational headquarters to higher ones.

In influencing decisions from the command group, the chief can be a key player. He must prove his ability to stay with key actions until complete, demonstrating his desire for excellence. He must, obviously, monitor the planning and execution of combat operations. Most incumbents do not visit subordinate headquarters to follow up on plans or actions. Most do, however, represent the commander, or CINC, at higher headquarters, with varying latitude to make decisions in their commander's, or CINC's, name. Surprisingly, the latitude for the chief's authority to make decisions seems greater in the higher headquarters than the lower.

Most operational level commanders see bright futures for their incumbent chiefs of staff. They forecast higher level commands and staff assignments, based on their performances as chiefs of staff in their current assignments. As to the future of the job, they almost all see continuation of current staff control needs, but in a world of faster and more complex communications and automated data management. Thus, we have a picture of today's operational level chief of staff.

VII - CONCLUSIONS

In some respects, today's commanders have overcome the shortfalls of doctrine. Doctrinally, the chief is viewed as someone who should make no command decisions but be prepared to defend them. The commanders and CINCs queried are more practical, but they vary in their use of the chief of staff based on personalities and relationships with their incumbents. This clearly leaves the force with varying degrees of sophistication in exercising staff control at the operational level. Several conclusions may be drawn, based on the examples previously discussed, which might serve to generate standardization among various operational headquarters.


First, staff structure requires close scrutiny. Based on the study of the emergence of the operational level commands, and on common sense, one concludes that the staff structure must serve the command structure. While this may seem obvious, the implication is that the methods of structuring and controlling staffs will change only if the methods of structuring operational commands change. What should not change is the functional requirement for the integration of intelligence, operations, and plans, as fully as possible, within all the major services as well as with allies. Alternatively, administrative and logistical structures will, undoubtedly, continue to be driven by service or national desires or needs.

Second, institutionalized authority for the chief of staff to command and control the staff is needed. The chief of staff's authority has previously been *restrictive*. A *permissive* approach to his authority and his duties, as previously indicated, could multiply his value to the operational level commander.


Finally, the man chosen to be chief of staff of an operational headquarters must meet his commander's special requirements. He must be educated; function well in his own service or national force; command the trust of his subordinates and the commander; be proactive and decisive; and be prepared for assignments to more responsible positions. Primarily, though, he must complement the commander. He should be of the same service as, and even be nominated for the position from a list of qualified candidates by, his commander. In this manner, the special relationship required between the commander and his chief of staff would not be left to chance or demand the continuous attention of the commander.

If a commander or CINC is to implement his vision for his command, he must ensure that his organization "has shared values; a decentralized ability to execute orders within the established intent; a common understanding of standards; common tactical and technical competence; common understanding of the commander's intent; and an ability to anticipate and deal with the unexpected". Once the commander expresses his visionary concept to his subordinate commanders, they formulate their own in keeping with his. The operational commander then must rely on his chief of staff to *sell* this vision to his staff despite differences in background or nationality. Thus, the chief of staff must be the commander's alter-ego and, ultimately, the *commander* of his staff.

ADMIRAL NIMITZ' JOINT STAFF ORGANIZATION
as
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, PACIFIC FLEET
and
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS''




GENERAL MACARTHUR'S COMMAND AND STAFF ORGANIZATION
as
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. ARMED FORCES, FAR EAST
and
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA¹



NOTES:

- * Force Commander Also Commands His Own National Component
- ***** MacArthur Works For Blamey Who Works For MacArthur
- Command
- -- Logistic Support Only

GENERAL EISENHOWER'S COMBINED COMMAND AND STAFF ORGANIZATION
as
COMMANDING GENERAL, EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, U.S. ARMY
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPE
and
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES*




NOTES:

- sd - Strategic Direction
- c -- Command
- Operational Control

* Where there is a British Chief, there is a U.S. Deputy Chief. Where there is a U.S. Chief, there is a British Deputy Chief. This is called *layering* in the AFHQ History. The term indicates full integration.

** Layering of Chiefs and Deputies of sections is the same as in fully combined sections. Parallel structure begins below the section leadership.


RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ETOUSA AND SHAEF¹



NOTES:

- ===== Same Individual
- Command
- xxxxx Staff Assistance on U.S. Matters
- +++++ Staff Supervision

GENERAL WILLIS HALE'S STAFF ORGANIZATION
as
COMMANDING GENERAL, SHORE BASED AIR FORCES, FORWARD AREA,
CENTRAL PACIFIC*



CHIEF OF STAFF SURVEY⁵

1. HIM

a. What is his education level? What education level should the position require?

Corps/Field Army/Major USAF Headquarters Level:

College, preferably with Master's Degree. Master's Degree. Master's Degree in International Affairs; military education should be at least Senior Service School level. Sufficient to make Brigadier General. Master's Degree in Public Administration. Should have Master's Degree and War College.

Joint/Unified Command Level:

Bachelor's Degree in Business Administration and Management; military experience coupled with a bachelor's degree is sufficient, but a master's degree in operations management, logistics management, advanced communications systems, or international law would be helpful. Master's Degree in Human Relations and has attended CGSC and Naval War College; position requires completion of Senior Service College as a minimum, and knowledge in geopolitics would be a plus. Education is not a player as long as the chief of staff can communicate clearly both orally and in writing at all levels. No requirement now, but may require intermediate or senior level joint staff education in the future. Should have Senior Service College and an undergraduate degree, but a graduate degree is desirable.

b. What is his background? What type of background should be expected of anyone filling the position?

Corps/Field Army/Major USAF Headquarters Level:

Infantry with personnel twist; this is good background. Operations and training. Helps if he has background in manpower, budget management, and, in some cases, installation management. Former combat arms unit commander. Progression through many tactical fighter flying jobs; overseas and CONUS; 130 combat flying missions over Vietnam. Background is not as important as mindset, as he must be able to juggle many balls at once and, most importantly, "think" as the commander thinks.

Joint/Unified Command Level:

Over 5000 flying hours in nine different aircraft; command and staff experience in different USAF commands and service with a specified command. Tactical troop unit time from troop/company through corps, staff time from squadron/battalion up to DA Staff, and service in special operations and both joint and combined environments; this position requires an individual with an extensive background in troop and staff assignments, preferably in units subordinate to this headquarters. A tour as an executive officer would be desirable. This is a key element, in that the chief of staff should know the organization, missions, and people. Chief of staff's background should complement the commander's, with broad experience geared to the range of forces in the joint command. Time in both tactical and training units; experience in Europe and in the Joint arena. Chief of staff is an engineer

and has commanded a brigade, a CONUS installation, and an engineer district; it is critical for the chief of staff to have served repeatedly in the region, otherwise it makes it difficult on the staff and subordinate commands to influence him on needs within the command.

c. What has his career pattern been like, to include experiences at different levels of command? What experiences and career patterns are called for by anyone filling the position?

Corps/Field Army/Major USAF Headquarters Level:

Company through Brigade command with Pentagon time (both operations and personnel areas). Troop command from platoon level up to Assistant Division Commander, staff duty orienting on operations. Ask him. Instructor pilot, flight commander in a tactical fighter training squadron, an aircraft program training manager at a major USAF headquarters, commander of two tactical fighter squadrons, Air War College, Air Staff, and a tactical fighter wing commander. Most experience has been in non-tactical commands, limiting his tactical experience; should have experience in staff from battalion/squadron to division, and command from company/battery/troop through brigade/group/DIVARTY/regiment, plus schooling and service at higher level to "get the big picture". Command through brigade level, with experience in Special Operations Forces and airborne units. He should have successfully commanded from platoon through brigade and be competitive for brigadier general.

Joint/Unified Command Level:

Commanded a wing and an air division and served at the headquarters of a specified command. Varied assignments between troop units and staff assignments, including Commandant of a training center, Chief of a JUSMAAG, and Deputy Corps Commander; position requires a broad, varied background in both tactical and academic assignments in order to broaden knowledge base. Command from platoon through regiment and center level, Special Operations Forces unit command in Republic of Vietnam, and assignments in education and military assistance; joint experience would be beneficial to anyone serving in the position. Experience is helpful, but can be gained over time in the position. Combat Engineer command through brigade level, and a division chief of staff; Cavalry; combat arms; a variety of command and staff experiences is desirable, such as DA Staff, JCS, OSD, or Army MACOM staff, in order to understand the workings and relationships among these headquarters; command at the two-star level is mandatory in order to understand high-level commands such as those subordinate to the headquarters in which he serves. Should have had staff assignment at Service Staff or JCS, with repeated tours in the region in which the headquarters is located.

d. What are his primary recognized skills? What special skills are required of anyone filling the position?

Corps/Field Army/Major USAF Headquarters Level:

Infantry skills: strong ability to coordinate actions, operational awareness, and "people-sensitive". Leadership and management skills. Enjoys dealing with people; flexible, innovative, demanding, and responsive to both boss and subordinates. A leader. Attention to detail plus ability to see

the big picture; recognizes key ingredients for quality staff action papers. Organization, writing, understanding of all major systems. Should have "people" skills plus ability to juggle many balls at once and determine the important from the unimportant, while getting maximum effort from the staff. Leadership, organization, and communication. He must be a mentor and trusted advisor to the staff. Organization, management, and ability to delegate authority.

Joint/Unified Command Level:

Leadership, ability to direct and control large numbers of people and functions and get results. Special Operations Forces, infantry, and basic leadership skills. Coordination, ability to delegate, communication, staff management, and leadership; all of these qualities mentioned plus ability to follow up are important for anyone in the position. The chief of staff must be a communicator, organizer, and planner, once again emphasizing that he must know the organization, missions, and people. He must be able to articulate, expand on, and implement the commander's desires. Grasp of the "big picture", to include political/military implications of actions. Chief of staff must be willing to work long hours, get involved in great detail, and be willing to make tough decisions; loyalty both up and down the chain is a prime requisite. Analytical, fast reader, and maintains a broad perspective.

e. What are his personal qualities? What personal qualities are needed by anyone filling the position?

Corps/Field Army/Major USAF Headquarters Level:

Good leader with ability to deal with people. Likes people and gets satisfaction from seeing them succeed. Enthusiastic, sincere, hard working, and approachable. A team player. Honesty and brains. Positiveness; must have ability to orchestrate the entire effort toward mission accomplishment, adjust to new and changing requirements, and cause the staff to do the same while minimizing frustration. Integrity, diligence, and common sense. He should be a mature family man who is raising, or has raised, children. He needs to be involved both socially and professionally in the community.

Joint/Unified Command Level:

A "can do", positive attitude which inspires the same attitude in the directors and staff. Incumbent's personal qualities are irrelevant; what is relevant is his experience and training, which promotes respect and trust of his staff and commander. People-oriented leadership style, integrity, willingness to listen to others, and a strong desire to do what is best for the command; these are paramount requirements for anyone in the position. He must have the ability and courage to be the commander's "Black Hat" guy. He brought a lot of personal experience in the region to the job and basically knew the job before assuming it. Generalship qualities of anyone deserving of two-star rank, hard-working, able to make difficult decisions, understands when and how to say "no", deals fairly with subordinates.

2. HIS DUTIES

a. What are the major challenges he faces?

Corps/Field Army/Major USAF Headquarters Level:

Coordinating efforts of a Combined staff. Having foresight. Accomplishing all tasks in accordance with commander's guidance and existing directives. Orchestrating the many directorates, staffs, and agencies needed to run the unit and its installations. Keeping the commander informed, while coordinating the staff to ensure that his policies are carried out. Preparing a Corps staff for combat. Ensuring that staff work is done completely and on time; ensuring that decision papers are concise, to the point, and have pertinent and viable recommendations. Overseeing execution of commander's staff directives. Ensuring that he knows the commander's priorities, can keep the staff focussed, and can keep subordinate commands informed. Organizing the efforts of staffs for a corps and a post. He has complete responsibility to ensure the smooth running of the staff and mission accomplishment, coupled with a requirement for properly caring for all subordinates.

Joint/Unified Command Level:

As both a deputy CINC and a chief of staff, carrying out responsibilities under JCS Pub IV; coordinating forces of the three major U.S. Armed Services; remaining abreast of politically and budgetary sensitive defense issues; directing staff efforts toward development of plans and programs which most effectively fulfill responsibilities in the command AOR or in support of other CINCs' AORs. Staying abreast of ongoing DOD-level debates concerning reassessments of the command's missions; conduct of daily business and wartime planning in an age of manpower constraints; organizing headquarters in accordance with JCS Pub IV; involving the command in the PPBS process; elimination of service parochialism within the command so that it will work, train, and fight as a joint team. Staff coordination and management. He must be able to "make things happen". He must manage a diverse staff. Managing a staff in the face of force modernization and reduced budgets poses unique challenges, requiring painful enforcement in a command used to years of increasing funds. Develop a staff environment of cooperation; manage change; allocate decreasing resources; plan for transition to war; deal with U.S. Country Teams within the region, and the civil and military authorities of allies.

b. Does he establish the nature of his position, do you establish it for him, or does he follow some guidelines established in doctrinal literature, or command SOPs? Would this be true of anyone filling the position?

Corps/Field Army/Major USAF Headquarters Level:

Combination of all three. The commander, along with the personality of the incumbent, establishes the nature of the position; the commander *commands* the unit, but the chief of staff *runs* the unit; this may not be true in all circumstances, based on the commander's desires. Commander spells out specific duties and areas of responsibility in a memorandum for the Corps Chief of Staff; does not delineate between the duties of the chief

of staff and the deputy commander, but tells the chief of staff to work it out with the deputy. As described in a manpower document. Both commander and chief of staff establish the nature. The nature is determined by how the staff, superiors, and subordinates perceive that he "speaks for" the commander. Both establish the nature.

Joint/Unified Command Level:

The nature of the position has been established for some time, as set forth in command SOPs. Chief of staff establishes it mostly himself; he directs the efforts of both the coordinating and special staff; he *commands* the staff. Chief of staff establishes the nature of the position himself, based on experience in similar position in the past; CINC provides specific guidance only as required. Normally, guidance comes down from the top; if the chief of staff becomes a "bottleneck", he's gone! This depends on the commander, but the incumbent establishes his own currently. CINC describes the nature of the position, but there is little in doctrinal literature or command SOPs which define the relationship between the CINC and his chief of staff; the chief of staff serves as a neutral advisor bringing a different perspective to current issues.

c. Does the size, complexity, and joint or allied composition of the headquarters offer any unique challenges for him? Would it for anyone else filling the position?

Corps/Field Army/Major USAF Headquarters Level:

A little of all of the above (no specifics); true of anyone in the job. Requires great patience. No experience at the allied or joint level other than during various CPXs and FTXs. All three are challenges since the corps always deals with the Air Forces, allied commands, and Territorial Forces. One headquarters is composed primarily of Reserve Component (RC) commands located in 47 different states, presenting a unique challenge; added to this, two-thirds of the Active Component units are at great distances from the headquarters; also, a great amount of planning and exercising is at the combined level. Unique challenge in one headquarters is the large number of civilians and individual mobilization augmentees required to execute a dual mission.

Joint/Unified Command Level:

The chief of staff is a member of a service different in orientation from that of the command, requiring him to be very experienced in joint operations and sensitive to the needs of a unified command. Relatively small and uncomplicated staff, but the joint nature provides challenges, especially concerning matters specific to services other than those through which the chief of staff has progressed; the chief of staff must provide balanced direction to the staff regardless of service affiliation or nature of the issues. All of the above have been and will continue to be challenges; for example, in a multinational command, there is much more effort required, to include national sensitivities, control of unilateral and multilateral classified materials, etc. Must work closely in the joint and combined arena for the region, must introduce U.S. doctrine and tasks in support of wartime operations, and support U.S. dependents overseas in an era of increased terrorist activity.

3. HIS RELATIONSHIP TO THE COMMANDER

a. Does he maintain a personal relationship with you or is it strictly professional? Would you desire a similar relationship with anyone filling the position?

Corps/Field Army/Major USAF Headquarters Level:

Both. Personal; they frequently socialize together; this is a positive relationship. Primarily professional. It is best for commander and chief of staff to be very close. Due to the large difference in rank in one headquarters, the relationship is mostly professional.

Joint/Unified Command Level:

Primarily a professional one as the CINC and the chief of staff came up through different services and have not known each other over the years in the manner of a single service orientation; also, the overwhelming demands of the CINC's time due to his role as a combined force commander in wartime precludes much time for social interaction with the chief of staff. Both, as the commander and the chief of staff came up through not only the same service, but the same general field of endeavor within that service. Personal, based on the CINC's desires; personality is the key determinant for the type of relationship between the CINC and the chief of staff. Professional! Both, but the chief of staff probably does not need to maintain as personal a relationship with the commander as the vice or deputy commander. Mostly professional. Incumbent has been acquainted with the CINC for almost 40 years, resulting in a relationship that is both personal and professional; CINC asks for the chief of staff's advice more often than any other person in the command to include the subordinate commanders.

b. Do you consult with him in the choice of coordinating staff or personal staff members, and does he offer any special insights into their selection? Would you desire a similar relationship with anyone filling the position?

Corps/Field Army/Major USAF Headquarters Level:

Yes on all counts. Assignments of personal staff members are discussed with the chief of staff and he is asked for recommendations. Commander chooses his personal staff; chief of staff selects members of the chief of staff Office; commander does not normally depend on chief's recommendations when selecting other staff members. Sometimes, but more would be better in order to free the commander from the chore. Commander consults the chief of staff on filling all primary staff position vacancies.

Joint/Unified Command Level:

Chief of staff has final decision authority on personnel selections up to the O5 level; the CINC reserves decision authority on O6 and above and on his personal staff. The CINC and the chief of staff discuss virtually all issues concerning the command, including selection of staff members; this aspect would be expected with anyone in the position. Commander has the prerogative, but should normally consult the chief; once again, this is

dependent on the chief's knowledge of the organization, mission, and the people. CINC usually chooses his own personal staff, but asks the chief of staff for observations before making the final selection; they also discuss together the various selections for staff directors at the Colonel and General Officer level before final selection.

4. HIS CONTROL OVER THE STAFF AND ITS ORCHESTRATION

a. How does he manage staff conferences: does he conduct frequent conferences with just the principal staff members; does he hold expanded staff conferences; are there cut-down conferences with the commander; and does he hold working breakfasts or luncheons? Would the style of control used by him be expected and/or workable with anyone filling the position?

Corps/Field Army/Major USAF Headquarters Level:

Frequent conferences with principle and special staff. Holds weekly conferences with staff principles (most are allies) and their deputies (most are U.S.). Sometimes hosts working meals. Bi-weekly meetings with just the principle tactical unit and garrison staff members; also, many informal "huddles" with key players daily; monthly luncheons held with division chiefs of staff and separate brigade deputies; more decentralized style than others may desire to use. Chief of staff manages staff conferences, but either the vice commander or commander is usually present; chief of staff holds monthly working luncheons with key staff members. Frequent conferences, where he shows talent for including and educating junior staff members. Two corps and post staff conferences per month, two mini-staff conferences per month, two daily staff conferences with the commander present, and one daily meeting with each corps principle staff member. Chief of staff must be a proactive planner, ensuring sufficient briefings are scheduled for the commander to keep him advised on visitors, training, and allied programs. Chief of staff holds weekly coordinating staff calls with the primary staff members and local commanders, and quarterly expanded command and staff conferences down to company level, including sergeants major.

Joint/Unified Command Level:

As the chief of staff sees his directors daily, there are not many formal staff meetings; the intelligence, operations, and plans/policy directors meet with the CINC and the chief of staff twice a week for about 30 minutes; a staff meeting is held twice a month for all directors and division chiefs; no working breakfasts or luncheons. Chief of staff holds two staff conferences weekly, with or without the CINC present, keeping the staff afterward for more detailed discussions whenever the CINC is present; rather informal control of the staff; no luncheons or breakfasts; others filling the position might feel more comfortable with a more formal arrangement. This aspect is based on the chief of staff's own personal leadership style and varies greatly. The incumbent holds three staff meetings per week plus *ad hoc* meetings with Directors; seldom has working meal meetings. Staff update is held once a week with the CINC usually present; additionally, monthly meetings of the board of directors are held with just the staff directors and the chief of staff, often tied in with working breakfasts.

Chief of staff meets with the CINC two or three times weekly privately or with the DCINC and staff directors present, usually with open format.

b. How does he make effective use of the SGS or its equivalent at your headquarters? Would this hold true for anyone filling the position?

Corps/Field Army/Major USAF Headquarters Level:

Follow up and follow through with coordination of plans and policies. SGS reviews everything coming into and leaving the office; also functions as deputy chief of staff. SGS is principally the agent for staff action control, ensuring timely and correct routing of administration for the command group; builds itineraries for key visitors. No such position in this command. SGS is kept abreast of all ongoing actions. SGS is the quality control agent for all paperwork coming into the headquarters; another chief of staff might make greater use of the SGS. SGS and deputy chief of staff are the chief of staff's confidants, knowledgeable about the entire operation, and managing administration and executive services. Chief of staff must hold a tight reign over the SGS to effect an orderly flow of staff actions and suspenses. Chief of staff uses the SGS as a deputy chief of staff and Protocol Officer; SGS also assists the Aides in calendar trouble-shooting and deconflicting the schedules of the command group.

Joint/Unified Command Level:

No SGS in this headquarters; both the CINC and the chief of staff have 06 executives and aides who perform minimal SGS-type duties. Chief of staff makes adequate use of the SJS for routine administrative functions which foster the flow of information, correspondence, and actions; similar arrangements would be expected with anyone else. The chief of staff uses the SGS as a link between the headquarters command group, the staff, and the subordinate staffs. The SGS has the charter to conduct "management by wandering around", keeping himself and the chief of staff apprised of the situation within the headquarters, but not covering the same territory as the chief, the deputy, or the commander. The chief of staff maintains very close relationship with the SGS, the only way to operate. SGS must be a true confidant of the CINC and the chief of staff; operates closely with the assistants to the staff directors; pulse of the staff; incumbent views SGS as the most important colonel on the staff. SGS examines soundness of staff proposals and reconciles staff nonconcurrences.

c. Does he establish informal channels within the command with subordinate or lateral headquarters and encourage personal relationships between the staff and their counterparts at those headquarters? Would this be expected of anyone filling the position?

Corps/Field Army/Major USAF Headquarters Level:

Yes to both. With the subordinate units on the same installation, this is relatively easy; this is strongly recommended; should be expected of anyone filling this position. Works both formally and informally with lateral and subordinate commands; needs to have contacts at all levels in order to work command problems quickly and effectively. Informal but professional, not personal as such. Chief of staff does this very well;

anyone in this position, to be effective, would need to do this. Informal channels, but professional ones. He encourages bilateral exchanges, both socially and professionally, with allied staffs.

Joint/Unified Command Level:

Chief of staff does not maintain informal liaison with subordinate commanders, but encourages directors and staff to maintain a continuing liaison with subordinate commands, JCS, and other unified commands. Yes to both. Normally; he had better if he wants to do a good job and be around for awhile. Absolutely, as it is critical that functional elements know, and deal with issues among national and allied counterparts at higher, lateral, and subordinate headquarters. Without these informal channels, the command could not function as effectively.

5. HIS INFLUENCE ON DECISIONS

a. Does he impose himself on critical actions and stay with them until they are completed? Would this be expected of anyone filling the position?

Corps/Field Army/Major USAF Headquarters Level:

Yes. Only a few; may be expected of anyone. Commander delegates to the chief of staff the authority in certain areas and expects him to work any problems that arise. To a degree; anyone must do this in order to be fully effective. This is required, not just expected.

Joint/Unified Command Level:

Yes. Primary duty, to *make* things happen for the commander. Chief of staff and SGS track critical actions through to completion.

b. Does he advise you on dealings with National or Allied "suggestions" or desires? Would this be expected of anyone filling the position?

Corps/Field Army/Major USAF Headquarters Level:

Yes to both. Chief of staff presents staff recommendation to commander that has been coordinated not only with his staff but subordinate units as well, whether the action deals with local, national, or allied issues. Obviously. Not applicable.

Joint/Unified Command Level:

Chief of staff advises the CINC on national matters, but only occasionally involved in allied dealings. Yes; his experience overseas, particularly in Europe, has been very helpful; this would be expected of anyone in the position. Incumbent advises on national issues, while CINC's allied chief of staff advises on allied issues (CINC dual-hatted).

c. Does he monitor the planning and execution of combat operations? How? Would this be expected of anyone filling the position?

Corps/Field Army/Major USAF Headquarters Level:

Yes; personal involvement with personal checks. Yes, through staff supervision. Yes; as leader of the Corps Main CP, chief of staff is responsible for coordinating deep, close, and rear operations. Yes; that is obviously what a corps headquarters does. Not involved in planning and executing combat operations, mainly concerned with deployment. He monitors commander's guidance and supervises its execution. Yes to the extent of his experience; he must have a depth of warfighting knowledge, based on experience in tactical units, in order to be fully effective in this area. Chief of staff uses prebriefs and backbriefs by staff members as mechanisms for monitoring combat operations.

Joint/Unified Command Level:

Monitors both planning and execution of combat operations and *ad hoc* planning situations. As the command is primarily a supporting command, the chief of staff is not normally involved directly in planning and execution of combat operations, but he does monitor the employment of forces "chopped" to other CINCs. No. Yes. Chief of staff remains completely informed on routine operations, but becomes completely involved when the situation is hot. Incumbent focuses on actions of the war planners on his staff, monitoring the development and implementation of war plans and contingency operations.

d. Does he make personal visits to subordinate headquarters? Would this be expected of anyone filling the position?

Corps/Field Army/Major USAF Headquarters Level:

Sometimes, but less than the commander or deputy. Very seldom, as subordinates are mostly allies. Chief of staff periodically visits subordinate units in the field, but not everyone desires to do this. Few. Seldom visits subordinate headquarters; Commander and vice commander normally visit field units. Not often. No, due to geographical distances involved. Chief of staff visits each subordinate command yearly.

Joint/Unified Command Level:

Chief of staff plans to visit each subordinate command at least once, to get a feel for how the subordinate command operates and what their problems are. Chief of staff occasionally visits subordinate commands, but his primary duties require him to remain in the headquarters. No, too busy. No, too many things to do at the headquarters; this is more of a function for the deputy or the vice. CINC asks that the chief of staff remain at the headquarters as much as possible to handle critical daily actions; when he does travel, he deals with subordinate headquarters chiefs of staff directly.

e. Is he ever dispatched to represent you to higher headquarters? With how much latitude to make decisions? Would this be expected of anyone filling the position?

Corps/Field Army/Major USAF Headquarters Level:

Yes, with wide latitude. Yes, with authority to represent the commander's position. Often represents the commander both in the field and in garrison; chief of staff remains well versed in the commander's concept and keeps aware of the parameters within which he can make command decisions. Yes, within guidance. Occasionally represents commander at higher headquarters. Yes, follows commander's guidance and has decision making authority. Yes, with great degree of authority, and there is always a telephone nearby. Yes, as chief of staff is fully aware of the commander's intent, priorities, and guidance. When chief of staff represents the commander, he has full authority to make decisions.

Joint/Unified Command Level:

Has not had to yet, but has the responsibility and authority to make decisions normally associated with a deputy CINC and chief of staff of a major command. No. Seldom. This is more of a job for the deputy or the vice. Yes, with quite some latitude. When he represents the CINC, the chief of staff can make policy decisions which fit within the CINC's broad policy guidance. The chief of staff is the "point man" for the command; hearing the bad news first, listening to concerns of subordinate and higher commands, serving as a "sounding board" for allies and the U.S. Embassy.

f. Is there any overlap between his duties and those of your deputy with respect to the decision-making process?

Corps/Field Army/Major USAF Headquarters Level:

Some (no specifics). Not really, as the chief of staff runs the staff and the deputy "backs the CG". No overlap; the deputy commands the Rear CP and conducts rear operations, while the chief of staff coordinates deep, close, and rear operations in the Main CP; in garrison, the deputy oversees the separate brigades and the installation. NO! No overlap unless one or the other is absent. Not really, as the commander, deputy commander, and chief of staff meet daily. Yes, but commander solved part of the overlap problem by writing a directive on the subject; there is still some overlap with the installation commander, but this is manageable. Some overlap, but close professional relationship and daily meetings keep coordination and cooperation flowing.

Joint/Unified Command Level:

Definitely, as the chief of staff is also the deputy. Little overlap between the chief of staff and the DCINC in the decision-making process. In many areas; for example, "people" issues, organizations, etc. It is the DCINC's responsibility to deconflict. As the deputy has a special list of missions from the CINC, and the CINC deals directly with the chief of staff, there is essentially no overlap.

g. Do you solicit recommendations from him on the advancement of subordinates? Would you expect to be able to do this with anyone filling the position?

Corps/Field Army/Major USAF Headquarters Level:

Yes to both. Commander and chief of staff discuss advancement potential of various subordinates; this depends on the relationship between the commander and the chief, but solicitation of input is probably the norm. Yes on staff, no on commanders. Yes, commander and chief of staff have an open line on this subject.

Joint/Unified Command Level:

This is not encountered at this command due to the joint nature; those who move up usually move on. Yes; expected of anyone. Frequently; this is why the chief of staff must know his people. CINC solicits advice from the chief.

h. Does he make decisions on the mundane, leaving you to decide the important issues or is he strictly in the role of recommendation, with no authority to make decisions in your name? Would this be the same for anyone filling the position?

Corps/Field Army/Major USAF Headquarters Level:

Makes both large and small decisions. Chief of staff makes a lot of decisions, but always informs the commander, and never usurps his command authority or established prerogatives. Commander makes the critical decisions involving policy; the chief of staff makes daily decisions which implement the commander's policies. Chief of staff authorized to make decisions on the commander's behalf in the spirit of *existing* policies and guidance, but back-brief the commander. Chief of staff has certain responsibilities delegated by the commander and generally has autonomy in those areas. He keeps the commander fully informed. Not yet to the extent desired by the commander, but will improve as chief of staff begins to "think" like the commander based on further exposure. Chief of staff handles the mundane, but keeps the commander informed; this would be true for anyone in the position once the commander trusts him. Commander relies heavily on the chief of staff to advise on status of staff projects, while handling the conduct of daily staff operations. Commander in one headquarters believes in "power down" philosophy, giving the chief of staff full authority in many areas when he is present and full authority to represent the commander in all staff-related issues.

Joint/Unified Command Level:

As both deputy CINC and chief of staff, he has great span of authority to make decisions. The chief of staff makes decisions on those actions he considers within his purview, otherwise, only in the absence of the CINC or DCINC. Frequently required to act on actions and make decisions independently, with little or no guidance. Chief of staff handles mundane issues with great latitude and forwards only those issues requiring the CINC's personal attention. Only makes decisions in accordance with commander's guidance. Depends on guidance from above; is the CINC a

micromanager or a delegator? Chief of staff makes important decisions within policy guidelines. Chief of staff makes decisions on issues which fall within the CINC's broad policy guidance, but the CINC decides on controversial issues. Within the context of broad policy guidance, the chief of staff makes decisions well beyond the mundane.

6. THE FUTURE

a. For what duties in the future does service as chief of Staff of your headquarters prepare the chief of staff?

Corps/Field Army/Major USAF Headquarters Level:

Division command, DA Staff directorate chief, joint staff directorate chief, combined staff. Hopefully, command, and chief of staff assignments in higher level staffs. Command of a separate brigade or a division, as well as any principle staff position at the MACOM or DA level. Command. Excellent preparation for higher command and staff positions. Command and staff at highest levels. Separate brigade or division command, assistant division commander, or higher level staff officer or chief of staff. He would be prepared immediately to assume the duties of a deputy commander in a division. Deputy commander at any joint command.

Joint/Unified Command Level:

Any JCS or DOD billet, or even a CINC of a unified or specified command. Prepares the chief of staff for such positions as DCINC, CINCPAC, JCS J3 or J5, and Director of the Joint Staff. This job prepares the chief of staff for either joint or single-service assignments, allowing him to be comfortable in any unified command or three-star assignment in the JCS, at OSD, or on DA Staff.

b. How do you envision changes unfolding today in the world situation affecting the staff composition, duties, and special challenges of your headquarters in the near future and into the Twenty-First Century, especially relating to command and control and the chief of staff's functions?

Corps/Field Army/Major USAF Headquarters Level:

Hard to tell at this time. Don't see much change, except that staffs are getting smaller with reductions of forces. The chief of staff needs to identify "What's really important" and focus on those priorities. Mobile Subscriber Equipment will probably change the way a corps does business, especially at Corps Main CP, but it is hard to tell; functions will probably not change, but one will need to respond more quickly to required actions. The amount of data available for the commander and chief of staff to sift through is approaching overwhelming status. The headquarters must become more responsive and automation seems to be the answer right now; old style World War II staff procedures are too slow, unresponsive, and limiting, considering the number of actions, and their depth, handled by the staff; for a corps to "think" at the operational level it must have sophisticated automation support, and the chief of staff must become comfortable with it. Increasing amounts of available information will cause the chief of staff to sift through a lot of chaff.

Joint/Unified Command Level:

Changes in the world situation will not particularly affect this staff's responsibilities or composition. Ongoing projects include upgrade of staff manning through joint Manpower Program and helping subordinate commands enhance warfighting capabilities. Chief of staff's functions will remain those of directing staff activities at the headquarters, working personnel issues, and pushing the staff to provide the CINC with the best possible service. As the command moves into the next century, routine paperwork will likely be replaced by computer networking, requiring the chief of staff to coordinate with the staff through local area networks (LANs); likewise coordination with higher, lateral, and subordinate commands will be realtime via modem; this will reduce workload but not volume of actions or level of importance. This depends on the guy in the driver's seat, but the chief of staff will probably become more involved at all levels. The evolution of improved computer capability for command and control and staff management will require the chief of staff to have an appreciation of both management information and decision support systems. Budget and manpower cuts in the future will pose critical challenges. As the Armed Forces become more technically oriented, with weapons systems reaching longer ranges and fewer personnel to man them, the staffs will see an increase in the fielding of complex command and control systems; the staffs will probably be smaller; and the budgets will undoubtedly be tighter. Staffs will be smaller, dealing with much more information, and probably not organized along traditional lines.

7. COMMENTARY

If there are any comments you may have concerning this survey or special considerations concerning the topic which may not have been sufficiently covered by the questions above, please include them in your response.


Corps/Field Army/Major USAF Headquarters Level:

The chief of staff, regardless of level, is the expeditor for the boss. He executes the boss' policies while simultaneously representing the desires of the major subordinate commanders. How he does this is highly dependent not only on his personality and leadership traits but on the personality and leadership traits of the commander. The chief of staff fills a unique position which is both demanding and important. He must be the alter-ego of the commander. It is a personal role which changes with each commander. Centralized selection for commanders *must not* be done as well for chiefs of staff. A commander must be afforded the opportunity to select his chief of staff. DA should support a policy, within reason (e.g., career progression, PCS, schools, etc.), of allowing every division and higher-level commander to select his own chief of staff. The chief of staff must be secure and professional.

Joint/Unified Command Level:

The chief of staff can really drive the flow of things around the command, managing paperwork, meetings, and the workload of the commander. He needs to be a "mover" and have the strong support of the staff, as a weak chief of staff can really slow down the organization.

CASE I: STAFF FOR UNILATERAL U.S. ACTION BY A UNIFIED COMMAND
(WITH OR WITHOUT TRANSITION)



NOTES:

Direct staff control currently

-- --

Direct staff control in case of transition

[---]

Joint exercise of oversight, but separate mechanisms for fulfilling the function


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Fully integrated; Joint exercise of oversight and function

(1/2)

Either service may fill the chair of section chief, but the other service fills the deputy section chief chair.


CASE II: STAFF FOR MULTILATERAL ACTION BY A COMBINED COMMAND



NOTES:

- Direct staff control currently
-- --- Direct staff control in case of transition
* Same service as others with "*"
@ Same service as others with "@"
If transition and creation of subtheater with service of
DSAC as primary element, DSAC may be designated
subtheater commander. DC/S becomes DSAC's C/S.
- [-----]
[---r---] Combined exercise of oversight, but separate mechanisms
[---l---] for fulfilling the function
- [-----]
[] Fully integrated; Combined exercise of oversight and
[-----] function
- (1/2) Either nation may fill the chair of section chief, but
the other nation fills the deputy section chief chair

CASE III: LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT



NOTES:

- * Same service as others with "*", primary service of SUC
- @ Same service as others with "@", primary service of UC
- ** Member of service with second greatest interest in SUC
- # Member of same nation/service as Allied Deputy SUC
- Direct staff control
- C-- C- Command, less operational control
- L-- L- Constant liaison
- A-- A- Staff Assistance
- [---] Combined exercise of oversight, but separate mechanisms for fulfilling the function
- [] Fully integrated; Combined exercise of oversight and function

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27. War Department. *Staff Officers' Field Manual*, (Washington: WD, 1928), 3.
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40. Field Manual (FM) 101-5, *Staff Officers' Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure*. (Washington: HQDA, June 1968), 1-3.
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45. Snyder. *op. cit.*, 6-7.
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50. *Ibid.*, 9-10.
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52. *Ibid.*, 8. Also, *History of AFHQ, Part I*, 19-20.
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54. Shaw. *op. cit.*, 17-18.
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57. 1984 FM 101-5, 3-1.
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60. *ANSCOL Basic Reading*, 10. To show just the main points, some of the details have been excluded. The diagram from which this was taken was also depicted in *Organization and Command Relationships During World War II*. (Norfolk: AFSC, 17 December 1951), Chart III-11 following p. 41.
61. Armed Forces Staff College. *Organization and Command Relationships During World War II*. (Norfolk: AFSC, 17 December 1951), Charts II-2 and II-3 following p. 16. Also, Heintz, *op. cit.*
62. Combined Chiefs of Staff, Directive, C.C.S. 304/12, subject: Directive to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, 12 February 1944. Also, described and pictured in part in *Organization and Command Relationships During World War II*. (Norfolk: AFSC, 17 December 1951), 42-56, and Charts IV-2 and IV-2a following p. 60.
63. Armed Forces Staff College. *Organization and Command Relationships During World War II*. (Norfolk: AFSC, 17 December 1951), Chart IV-3 following p. 60.
64. Col. Carson A. Roberts, USMC. *Organization and Functions of a Joint Air Staff, Central Pacific*. (Ft. Leavenworth: CGSC, 1946-47), 2.
65. Generally, periods separate the responses of different commanders, CINCs, or chiefs of staff. Semicolons separate the portions of each response. This author only modified the responses to the degree by which respondents could not be identified or held attributable.

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